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Mackowski, Chris and Kristopher D. White. Turning Points of the American
Civil War. Southern Illinois University Press, $24.50 ISBN 9780809336210
Turning points can be tricky things. Witnesses rarely recognize them as such until long
after the fact, and each successive generation is likely to have its own favorite anyway. As a
grade school Civil War buff touring the Gettysburg battlefield in the Summer of 1963, I stood at
the so-called "High Water Mark" while my father pondered the related "might have been" aloud.
Not until college – E.B. Long's Civil War course at the University of Wyoming – did I get a
whiff of 1864: Grant's butcher bill, Lincoln's political problems, and, thanks to B.H. Liddell
Hart, the significance of Atlanta being "ours, and fairly won." So, if Lee's biggest failure and
Sherman's most important success were both watersheds, which was the Continental Divide?
Or was there one? In the foreword, Thomas Desjardin notes that the High Water Mark
was mainly John Badger Bachelder's cash cow and that others more qualified to comment on
Gettysburg's historical significance had already moved on to other battlefields when Bachelder
arrived there. Co-editors Mackowski and White, founders of the Emerging Civil War blog,
include nine turning points explored by public historians with backgrounds in each. No
contribution refutes another; the editors intend only that their volume serve as a point of
departure for readers in search of their own conclusions. The happy result is that we can see
turning points for what they really are: ex post facto conventionalizations that make something
as numbingly chaotic as war appear slightly more orderly and understandable.
Some of those turning points will come as no surprise. Kevin Pawlak notes that the
Emancipation Proclamation opened the door for U.S. recruitment of 180,000-plus blacks, over
half of which were former slaves. What U.S. Grant termed "the heavyest [sic] blow yet given
the Confederacy" (Pawlak's title) changed the war's dimensions by ultimately forcing the South
to choose between slavery and independence. When Patrick Cleburne and others urged
manumission as payment for Confederate military service, they did so because no other route to
independence remained. Not that such a desperation measure would have helped: escaped
slaves who wore blue were free the day they enlisted. Given more space, the author might also
have noted that Lincoln's additional war aim sometimes hurt Union reenlistments and unit
performance in 1864 because not every bluecoat savored the role of de facto abolitionist. In
Defeating Lee: A History of the Second Corps, Army of the Potomac (reviewed in this journal's
Winter 2012 issue) Lawrence A. Kreisler elaborates on that unintended result.
Not surprisingly, two of the contributors focus on Ulysses S. Grant. Like J.F.C. Fuller
and numerous others, Daniel T. Davis sees the fall of Vicksburg as Grant's springboard to
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stardom, not only because of operational daring, low casualties (except for the Union assaults of
19 and 22 May), and significant strategic results, but because the capture of that particular
objective encouraged Grant to see all subsequent operations in strategic perspective. Although
peripheral to Davis's central argument, two or three more sentences on the 30,000-plus paroled
Confederate prisoners would have added perspective; not only did parole violations help
convince Grant to suspend prisoner exchanges, but a large number of non-violators quit the war
for good. Especially when compared with the Army of Northern Virginia's simultaneous retreat
in good order from Gettysburg, such disintegration stands out.
Ryan Longfellow's portrayal of Grant in the Wilderness also underlines Grant's strategic
insight, while noting the concomitant determination so essential now that he faced an enemy who
enjoyed the advantage of interior lines. Having famously chastised an officer for worrying too
much about what Lee was going to do, Grant nevertheless realized that Lee was a cut above
anyone he had faced previously. And by ordering an advance after such a bloody tactical
stalemate, the general indeed convinced his troops that a significant change had occurred. Even
so, this reviewer remains unsure of Grant's most important turning point. He built his reputation
slowly and advanced, sometimes by default, as others failed. One might argue that the Grant
who looked as though "he had determined to drive his head through a brick wall" first emerged at
Belmont in November 1861, when he learned to overcome the undue counsel of his fears. (p.
162) Possibly the key event was his 30 April 1863 crossing of the Mississippi when, cut off from
his base of supply, he nevertheless appreciated being "on dry ground on the same side of the
river with the enemy." (p. 144)
John Bell Hood's appointment to command the Army of Tennessee and the election of
1864 both relate to the fall of Atlanta. Addressing the former, Stephen Davis emphasizes the
flaws of Hood's predecessor as much as Hood's, as well as the lack of alternatives open to
Jefferson Davis during July 1864. Many readers will concede both points, but remember that
neither Grant nor Sherman criticized Joseph E. Johnston's Fabian approach after the war. Davis
notes this, yet chalks up the Confederates' lost opportunity at Cassville on 19 May in one
sentence to a changed tactical situation on Hood's front. This take on a self-promoting
subordinate who shamelessly lobbied for Johnston's job on the grounds that Johnston lacked a
killer instinct would have been more compelling had the author discredited the most popular
competing argument: that Hood misread the situation and did not attack when he should have,
thereby squandering Joe Johnston's only opportunity to counterpunch. As for Hood's subsequent
evacuation of the city he was sworn to defend, Andrew Rea Redd gives it no more ink than
Confederate defeats at Mobile Bay or in the Shenandoah Valley, all of which exacerbated severe
divisions within the Democratic Party as Lincoln stood for reelection. Redd's most important
observation stems from a counterfactual: even if McClellan had been elected, he argues, Union
military campaigns would have continued as long as they yielded success.
This volume's four other turning points will appear to many in the lower case, not as
watersheds so much as actions that yielded consequences. Nevertheless, commentary on these
provokes thought as well. Robert Orrison reminds us that, despite its small scale and the lack of
a rebel exploitation, Union defeat at First Bull Run enabled George B. McClellan's emergence
and his creation of the Army of the Potomac, the largest and best supplied field army on either
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side. Whether the U.S. military "came of age that summer" (p. 23) without a major victory or a
grand strategy is more debatable.
James A. Morgan's commentary on the Union defeat at Ball's Bluff is a similarly mixed
bag. The consequence was civilian interference, the battle's most famous fatality being Colonel
Edward D. Baker, a friend of Lincoln's and popular abolitionist senator-turned brigade
commander. Baker's radical Republican colleagues responded by creating the Joint Committee
on the Conduct of the War, which blamed Baker's commander, Brigadier General Charles Stone.
Stone had been nowhere near the battle, but was a Democrat who had returned two Maryland
slaves to their owners. That he had done so in perfect accordance with federal policy mattered
not. The JCCW's abuse of power in the wake of Ball's Bluff is thus obvious enough, yet Morgan
allows that Stone would have been targeted later anyway. Indeed, any civil war in which
political patronage and outright micromanagement do not play inflated roles is hard to imagine.
That the JCCW wanted a war to extinguish slavery is also clear, but its creation in the wake of
such a minor engagement suggests ongoing dysfunction as much as change.
Of the nine authors under consideration, Gregory A. Mertz has the toughest task of all,
and one that will likely continue to keep Civil War roundtables occupied: determining how
much Albert Sidney Johnston's death hurt the Confederate cause. And now that counterfactual
analysis has gained some credibility, "What if?" is more than a parlor game. America's largest
battle to date by far, the bloodletting at Shiloh would have been a turning point even had Sidney
Johnston survived it. Staying within the current historiographical mainstream, Mertz rejects a
favorite Lost Cause lament: that the Confederates would have won at Shiloh and controlled the
West had that fateful shot missed. Disclaimers notwithstanding – no one can tell what a luckier
Johnston would have done late in the afternoon of 6 April 1862 – available evidence suggests
that Grant's Last Line probably would have repelled an assault should Johnston have led one.
So, too, does Mertz hold that only the failures of Johnston's successors make his death worthy of
consideration as a turning point. The overall assessment of Johnston's potential is positive, yet
the author treats his subject's mistakes thoroughly enough so that the reader can extrapolate from
those as well.
Kristopher D. White sees Chancellorsville not only as Lee's greatest triumph, but as a
turning point because all of his subsequent victories came while on the strategic defensive.
Giving another black eye to Lost Cause historiography, he treats Jackson's death as part of a
larger problem. The "battering ram"-like Confederate attacks of 3 May, he argues, were the tip
of an iceberg: the unsustainable casualty rate that Lee's generalship had always inflicted, and
would continue to inflict, on his own army and key subordinates (122). Like Malvern Hill,
Second Manassas, Antietam, and even Fredericksburg, that key moment at Chancellorsville was
a self-inflicted wound that led inexorably to another – in this case, the biggest of all. That
Gettysburg might have turned out differently had Lee's pre-Chancellorsville chain of command
survived must remain another of those tempting "what ifs."
In sharing public historians' thoughts about various turning points, Mackowski and White
invite the rest of us to ponder the concept for ourselves. Are turning points invented by
historians or merely discovered by them? To what extent can an event's participants recognize
its significance? Do park visitors who have not done several thousand pages of background
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reading need these signposts more than those of us who have? And if turning points are
necessary constructs that make a larger event more understandable, how much might they distort
it in the process? Amidst these uncertainties is a given: this volume will force at least some
readers to rethink their preconceptions.
JOHN DALEY is a former Armor officer who teaches the military history courses at Pittsburg
State University in southeastern Kansas.
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